Autocracy and the Principle of Non-indifference

Introduction

In the last decades, the African continent has been the theatre of massive human rights abuses, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and the den of autocracy and authoritarian regimes, and is still prone to various forms of intra-state violence (Rudebeck L. and O. Tornquist: 2004). The failure of regional and international actors to protect civilian populations against international crimes, most horribly illustrated during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, has prompted UN members to unanimously adopt the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P). This commitment provides that states are primarily responsible for protecting their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and should assist each other in fulfilling this responsibility, but also entails that if a state fails to do so, the international community will respond, using peaceful means or, if such means fail, through coercive action. The African Union has been a major factor in establishing peace, security and development in Africa. Today, however, the intranational body is struggling in the midst of a perceived dissipating appetite for supporting continental institutions. Previously seen as the panacea to Africa’s continuing problems with violence and corruption in society, under the slogan ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, this paper argues to reflect on the concept of autocracy amidst the disparity of elections and electoral results and its controversy, to suggest where and how the regional body could intervene even when the will of the people has reflected in their choice either electing an authoritarian or a ‘saint’. Recognizing that the measured successes in political emancipation which have been recorded across the African continent do not seem to have translated into economic and social gains for its 1.2 billion citizens, the AU adopted a new development framework dubbed ‘Agenda 2063’. The framework calls on African leaders to rediscover the ‘Pan African’ spirit and to create the ‘Africa, Africans want’. In practice this means a new focus and engagement with the African Diaspora, tapping into their strong track-record in economic development. This presentation takes us to look at some key concepts which begs the question of autocracy and the principle of non-indifference. For the purpose of space, Zimbabwe is chosen as a case to respond to the question.

Implementing Non-Indifference: From Rhetoric to Reality

The Indicative Work Program of the Peace and Security Council states that the AU will endeavour to be present on the ground where there is a need for a peace operation. Whether as a standalone AU operation or in partnership with RECs the UN, and other partners, the AU has indicated its commitment to being active in peacemaking and peace building. Does this demonstrate a political commitment towards implementing the doctrine of non-indifference.

Diplomatic Non-Indifference: The case of Zimbabwe

In 2005, the AU attempted to appoint the former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano as the AU’s Special Representative to Zimbabwe to try and persuade an intransigent Mugabe regime to negotiate with the opposition parties and find a political and economic solution to the crisis. However, on August 17, 2005 the Government of Zimbabwe rejected the appointment of Chissano, saying that it could not negotiate with the opposition, which it perceives as being beholden to the Government of the United Kingdom . In appointing Chissano the AU was demonstrating that it was not indifferent to the situation in Zimbabwe, but critics expressed the view that the AU seemed to be doing too little too late (Sorensen G: 2010). Subsequently, the Southern African Development Community was appointed by the AU to address the Zimbabwean crisis. The retained a role as part of the Reference Group, together with the UN and other international partners.

In January 2008, at the Annual Summit of the AU Heads of State and Government, held in Sharm-el-Sheik, called on the parties in the Zimbabwe crisis to meet and agree on steps to establish peace and national reconciliation. The AU Summit also asked the parties to establish an inclusive government. The AU endorsed and supported the SADC

mediation initiative, led by President Thabo Mbeki. On September 15, 2008, in Harare,

the key parties to the crisis ZANU-PF led by President Robert Mugabe, and the two MDC Formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai, as the Prime Minister, and Arthur Mutambara, as the Deputy Prime Minister, signed an agreement that outlined a government of national unity. Indeed, the AU’s engagement in the Zimbabwe issue, albeit in a supporting role, does demonstrate a commitment to non-indifference. Some analysts would argue that the agreement came too late, but if it lays the foundations for national reconciliation then it could reinforce belief that the AU will from now on manifest more commitment towards resolving political problems on the African continent.

The AU’s attempt to address the Zimbabwean issue demonstrates that the organization is at least trying to take responsibility for the behaviour of its members. If the agreement signed on September 15, 2008 holds then it will be another demonstration of the important role of the AU and its partner sub-regional organizations in implementing its doctrine of non-indifference. This type of practice needs to become second nature to the continental organization. There are several other situations around the continent which require similar intervention, for example, in northern Uganda and the ongoing dispute with the Lord’s Resistance Army. The AU, as a collective body, should not wait until a situation has got out of hand before intervening (The Guardian News Paper: October, 2010). Nor should it always wait for the international community to make the first move. However, collaboration with the UN and other partners will be crucial if the AU is to succeed in achieving its vision and implementing its policies.

Does the Principle of non-indifference make any difference in the case of autocracy following elections?

                                                                                                            

The United Nations Charter lays emphasis on the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, but significantly also recognises the need for the SC to encourage regional arrangements to deal with peace and security. This delegation of powers is subject to two conditions: no enforcement should be applied by regional organisations without the Security Council’s authorisation, and the latter should, at all times, be fully informed of the activities undertaken or contemplated by regional organisations in the maintenance of regional peace and security (Seligman, A. B:  2001).

The Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2002 takes due account of the UN Charter, and the AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol is also mindful of these provisions (Stoker G: 2010).

Yet, African regional and sub-regional organisations, frustrated that the security council has not always lived up to its responsibility towards the continent, have decided to create some degree of self-sufficiency by setting up their own instruments to support peace, security and stability initiatives usually at great sacrifice.

The AU deployments in Burundi (2003) and Darfur (2004) are cases in point. This position is underpinned by the challenging principle of “non-indifference” that emerged when the AU officially launched the PSC in Addis Ababa. On that occasion, leaders reaffirmed their commitment to “the promotion of a stable, secure, peaceful and developed Africa”, and their “desire to assume a greater role in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa”. In this vein, the justification of the AU to intervene upon an election of an autocratic leader can be justified since it underpins the welfare of the populace. African leaders also spoke of the dawn of a new era of “non-indifference”, which they hailed as a marked change from the old non-interference policy that had crippled its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Sorensen, G: 2010).

The PSC makes it possible for the AU, in the name of non-indifference, to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in the event of an imminent threat to peace, security and stability. Apart from practical necessity, non-indifference is warranted also as a moral imperative to concretise the ideal of African solidarity and accelerate regional integration. Since the OAU morphed into the AU, the political and legal context has changed dramatically in terms of interference in the internal affairs of member states (Szeftel M: 2006).

The AU enjoys the use of broad prerogatives, yet the question is, can it really deliver on its promise? Put simply, can non-indifference really make a difference?

The answer depends, among other factors, on whether the AU is apt to build a genuine security partnership of trust and cooperation with national governments, sub-regional security mechanisms and other partners.

Concluding Remarks

The case can be made that the AU has experienced a significant shift in terms of embracing the doctrine of non-indifference and committing itself to R2P, and for this reason the regional body’s intervention in an authoritarian regime can be plausible provided it is rooted on the core principle of intervention not interference. The AU has taken an interventionist and active stance with regard to situations in Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, Comoros, and Zimbabwe, and is actively involved in supporting other peace operations around the continent. Given the youth of its institutions the AU, although it has made a significant effort to conduct peace operations, is far from operationalizing an effective R2P regime. For example, the limitations of its fledgling institutions have been exposed in the complex humanitarian situation in Darfur. It is too early to pass definitive judgment on the AU’s commitment to R2P since the paradigm shift in attitudes that the AU is attempting to bring about, and the institutions that it has developed to do so, have to be given an opportunity to work. The African Union will need to seriously re-orient the political leadership of the continent to maintain a vigilant approach to ensuring non-indifference and taking decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring R2P implementation will not be met.

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