Introduction
Among the many captivating issues which capture the banner
headlines of various news prints is the persistent unrest and conflicts within
the Middle East Region. As such, in broaching the issue of conflicts and the
various forms of upheavals in the Region, the region’s complex nature cannot be
overemphasised. Factors constituting to the upheavals ranges from territorial
disputes to religious extremism or fundamentalism; from the politics of water
to conflicts over rich minerals such as oil; from authoritarian regime to issues
over gender and human rights and inter
alia. Over the years, the Region has seen various forms of conflicts emanating
from the factors listed above, ipso
facto, it is worthy to note that the conflicts do not only depend on these
alone. There are other factors which may include first, the imperial carving up of the region
to suit the interests of the European colonial powers, which cut across all
kinds of ethnic, religious and tribal lines, creating new artificial, legal
borders, and even entirely new states.
This had a destabilizing effect on the region, as these
new borders were usually not regarded as legitimate (Fawcett, 2005). Second, is
the creation of the Zionist State of Israel, with the dual outcome of the loss
of the Palestinian homeland, and the massive displacement of refugees across
the region. Third, and in more recent times, the invasions of Iraq and
the deployment of US troops in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia totally altered
the balance of power in the region and inflamed the hearts of many contemporary
jihadist’s including Osama bin Laden (Atwan 2006). A fourth, factor would be
the region’s oil wealth and thus, strategic and economic importance to a
hegemonic power, trying to attain a critical leverage over any challenging
power. Although, these factors are of the upmost importance, it is beyond
the scope of this essay to analyse them any further. The argument here is that,
there are several other factors which forms the basis of the upheavals in the
region, but for the purpose of this paper, only three of these factors will be
explored. In this regard, this paper
will examine the disparity around the politics of water in the region, the
discrepancies around oil as a sustaining factor to authoritarian regime which
hinders democracy and the hindrance of democracy gives birth to various forms
of agitations which sometimes amounts to series of protest such as the Arab
Spring, and lastly religious extremism which is more of a hermeneutical concept.
The Paper argues that these key issues have been a gargantuan
contributing factor to upheavals in the
region. As such, the paper is divided into three sections (which exclude the
introduction and conclusion); the first part reviews water politics as a major
source of upheavals in the region; the second part takes a look at religious
extremism which the paper argues that, such approach to religion breeds
terrorism which in turn creates conflicts and other forms of upheavals. The
paper further substantiates its argument that, when religion is viewed through
a myopic lens, it nurtures religious fundamentalism/extremism. The third section
explores the discrepancies over the oil well and worth as a sustaining factor
which hinders the seed of democracy from being sown, and this in turn breeds
agitations which fuels protests; and the conclusion summarises the various
arguments of the paper.
General Overview of
water Scarcity in the Region and Water Sovereignty
Among the many issues which constitutes to the entire
hullabaloo about water in the region, it is worthy to note that the region has
been adversely affected by climate change. This has led to the entire Middle
East becoming dryer, thus meaning that water volumes, be it in aquifers or
river basins, are declining. According
to Norton (2005) the aquifers are not being recharged at optimal levels due to
a decrease in annual rainfall and because of over-pumping by humans, which has
upset the delicate equilibrium of the hydrological cycle. The extent to which
this can be reversed is unknown. The region is also experiencing more frequent
and longer lasting droughts. The severe water strain is causing the
desertification of arable land used for agriculture, which in turn destroys the
livelihood of the majority of people in the region.
Therefore, water scarcity is steadily affecting food supply.
This is a crisis when we combine the issue of a rising population in the
region. A larger population will need more water and food resources, which are
already at break point. Also, the rising living standards across the region
will mean that per capita, there will be more consumer demand for water to be
used in daily life. When all three factors are added together the situation
looks bleak (Farrant, 2007).
Water is a contentious issue for states because it does not
neatly fit into the legal parameters of a state. The psycho-political borders
of a state cannot usually extend to completely encompass a water system. Hence,
water is a trans-boundary resource, unlike, say a diamond mine. Water’s natural
tendency to flow over and under vast sways of land, cutting across state
borders, makes it highly difficult and expensive to control and measure. Also,
water maybe conceptualized as a zero-sum game, in that, when one party utilizes
some, it directly affects the amount left for the other parties. The legal
questions over who has rights over water have no consensus as yet. Such
questions are, for example, who owns a river that flows within two states. Is
it the upstream state where the river begins, or the downstream state where the
water ends? Such a fundamental question over water sovereignty is nevertheless very
complex once the involved parties have to decide exactly how to split the
volume of water they are each entitled to (Jobson, 2003).
From the Euphrates to the Nile and the West Bank: the
potential for violence
Flint and Waal (2008) opine that water can be a divisive
issue within the region. In order to illustrate this, I shall now consider the
politics surrounding the region’s most important river basins: firstly, the
Tigris and Euphrates. Modern day Turkey has the advantaged position of being the
upstream party. This means that Turkey has the power to be able to affect the
flow of the rivers into the downstream states, which include such countries as
Syria and Iraq, among others. Both these states are highly dependent on the
continuous flow of these rivers to irrigate their scarce arable land. Moreover,
Turkey has invested heavily into water infra-structure. Its project for
utilizing its water is called the Anatolian Project. This includes 66 dams, 60
hydro-electric stations and many drainage and irrigation schemes. Such a vast
project significantly hinders the amount of water flowing into the downstream
parties thus negatively affecting them both, socially and economically.
Since the 1970’s, Syria and Iraq had been working together to
put political pressure on Turkey to adopt a water sharing arrangement, which
would take their needs into account. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has
taken Iraq out of the water equation, and consequently made Turkey stronger.
Iraq has been left out of water sharing agreements by the other parties (Orr,
2009). This has had a devastating effect on Iraq. It has seen 36% of its total
arable land turn to desert in an irreversible way, which has led to 3.3 million
Iraqi’s displaced and forced to live on the outskirts of the cities in Latin
America-style, shanty towns. Such a situation is very unstable and will cause a
lot of resentment within Iraq and may perpetuate the internal conflict for
longer (Jobson, 2003).
The second river basin I will reflect on will be the Nile
basin. The power make-up in the Nile basin is almost a reversal of the
Tigris-Euphrates situation. Egypt is a downstream state. However, it has power
relative to the upstream states. This is only due to the extensive investment
in water infra-structure that Egypt has carried out, first during colonial rule
under Britain, and then pursued independently thereafter (Allan, 1999). Water
security is of vital importance to Egypt because only 5% of its land is viable
for agriculture and hospitable to live on, thus making water control a matter
of high politics. The upstream parties are east African states with a much more
lush landscape relative to most of the Middle East. These states were actually
hindered in their development of water works by the British in order to secure
Egypt’s control. Since independence, they lack the expertise, technology and
capital to develop such complex and expensive infrastructure (Flint and Waal,
2008). However, once these states do
utilize their water resources and begin to hinder the flow to Egypt, the
situation may become very volatile. Egypt has already stated that under the
current regime, Egypt would only go to war for water.
Without an adequate
and enforceable water sharing arrangement, conflict could be inevitable. Already
Sudan is experiencing severe water shortages although to what level it is
caused by Egypt or climate change is unknown. Sudan’s arable land is also very
scarce. Therefore, the loss of huge sways of grazing land is a catastrophe.
Lakes and wells which have allowed cattle and camel herders to live in peace
for hundreds of years have all but dried up, leaving the herders to fight over
what is left or lose not just their livelihoods but their entire way of life.
The Bedouin camel herders can no longer follow the well known desert routes
because the wells they depend on are dry. Thus a conflict for land and water
resources has exacerbated the other conflicts in Sudan pushing rival
communities to violence (Flint, 2008).
In respect to the Jordan basin, one must remember that the
volumes are much less relative to the Nile or the Tigris-Euphrates. Israel, the
water hegemon of the Levant, due to its water infra-structure and high-tech
industry is currently experiencing a continual and deepening water crisis. This
is a security threat to the sustainability of the State in itself. Thus, it
reduces the possibilities for political negotiations with other parties. With this, Anthon (2007) cites an example with
the West Bank. The West Bank is relatively rich in water, due to ground water
within its three major aquifer systems. These aquifers are the reason why the
Israel’s internationally condemned settlements continue to expand. A look at
the geography would indicate that they are directly positioned to correlate
with the high ground on top of the aquifers. Thus the settlements have
abundance of water and arable land. Also, from their high latitude on top of
the hills they can control the flow of water downward, thus making the
Palestinians totally dependent on them for water (Anon, 2009).
The Palestinians have not been allowed to develop their own
water infrastructure and the walled settlements are actually separating them
from their water and land resources. This shows that a Palestinian State in the
West Bank is not a possible option for Israel. Already experiencing a water
crisis and unsure future, it cannot give up the rich West Bank, which it feels
is vital for its water security. Therefore, the only possible option of a
Palestinian State in the West Bank will be a semi-autonomous cluster of
unviable cantons with total water dependence on Israel. The Golan Heights also
present a political obstacle to negotiations and friendly relations with
Israel’s neighbouring states. Israel is holding on to the Heights because they
are strategically important to protect the Sea of Galilee, which is the main
water supply of Israel. Therefore, until water issues can be resolved they are
a major source of instability and an obstacle to peace in the region (Allan,
1999).
Tenably, Water, although a divisive issue, can also have the
potential to foster greater cooperation. It is hopeful that there has not of
yet been a water war in recorded history. The closest a war solely fought for
water has ever come to materializing was in 1975 when Syria sent her troops to
the Syrian-Turkish border in retaliation for Turkey’s unilateral decision to
fill the Ataturk Dam, significantly harming Syria’s economy temporarily
(Jobson, 2003). Whereas wars have been fought with water as a factor, it is
usually sidelined and as only of secondary importance to the conventional war
aims of a state.
Religious Extremism/Fundamentalism
being a factor of the upheavals
The Middle East is one of the most religiously diverse
regions in the world. Besides being home to holy sites for the three main
Abrahamic religions Christianity, Islam and Judaism, this region houses
religions including Zoroastrianism, the Druze religion, Buddhism, Yaziti,
Samaritanism and the Baha’i faith, among many others. According to a
World Values Survey report that collected data between 2005-2007, 93 percent of
residents of nine Middle Eastern countries Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Iran and Algeria
said that God was “very important” in their lives. Meanwhile, only
about 53 percent of United States citizens responded alike on the same survey.
This medley of beliefs can lead to difference in opinion and conflict,
which often leads to religious disputes in the region.
Religious
forces
There are many fundamentalist religious forces
acting in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and other Middle East countries.
Even though fundamentalists do not automatically equate to extremists or
terrorists, there are many Middle East adherents to the religious writings of
Taqi al Din ibn Taymiyyah (1269-1328), Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) (White, 2006),
and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1787) (Marsden,2002) that preach not only
Islamic conservatism but violent rejection of other religions and violence
against nonbelievers. This adds to the fact that the region is not only an
Islamic territory but also has the core foundation of some other religions such
as Christianity and Judaism. Some of the early modern fundamentalist precepts
were voiced by the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan
al-Banna. At that time, the Brotherhood’s leadership saw great social injustice
and economic disparity in Egypt (White, 2006). In seeking to establish that
Islam was a religion encompassing all aspects of political, social, and
economic life, it was the Brotherhood that first proposed a government based on
Islamic religious principles. In addition, some Brotherhood members advocated
the right of a movement to take up arms against ‘impure’ Muslims and regarded
Shari’a as governing civil as well as religious life. Building upon the
Brotherhoods’ teachings, Qutb’s writings justified jihad to oppose those in
power (Marsden, 2002a).
These teachings provided extremists religious
justification for opposing Muslim secular regimes as well as conservative, but
autocratic, Islamic governments. In a tragic example for his role in signing a
peace agreement with Israel, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated in
1981 by members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a radical terrorist group with roots
in the Muslim Brotherhood.
As much as the preceding Muslim fundamentalist
philosophers influenced individuals like Osama Bin Laden and his mentor,
Abdullah Azzam, there was perhaps no greater fundamentalist upheaval than the
1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. Previously there had been political
revolutions founded in Islam resulting in the overthrow of colonial powers;
Algeria for example. However, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini organized a popular
revolt based on a return to fundamentalism and the rule of Shari’a law.
Following the successful overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Khomeini launched his
own vision of an Islamic caliphate using violence in the form of support for
Hizballah (Marsden, 2002b). It may be said that modern Middle East religious
terrorism began as a function of the Iranian revolution. In fact, in 1968 there
were no identifiable religious terrorist groups. That number had increased to 2
in 1980, 11 in 1992 and 26 in 1995, nearly half of the total number of
terrorist organizations for that year identified by Bruce Hoffman (1999) in the
Rand Review.
Interestingly, in 1995 terrorist acts committed in
the name of religion accounted for only 25 percent of the terrorist incidents,
but accounted for 58 percent of the fatalities (Hoffman, 1998). The influence
of religion cannot be underestimated when discussing forces contributing to
Islamic extremism in the region. Bin Laden and his followers see the current
struggle with the West as a long, defensive, historical struggle blessed by
Allah (Abdella, 2003). Suicide bombers go to their targets with thoughts of
martyrdom and heavenly rewards. Some radical clerics also provide the spiritual
guidance and approval allegedly required prior to a mass killing or other type
of terrorist attack. Finally, the influence of Muslim clerics can currently be
seen in Iraq as Muqtada al-Sadr has demonstrated with his potential to incite
the Shi’a masses. Conversely, other clerics such as Grand Ayatullah Sayyid Ali
Husayni Sistani hold impeccable religious credentials that could influence
populations in a positive manner should they choose to do so. In so far as the
region is endowed with such a tremendous religious traditions, the fundamental
approach to the issue of faith pose a threat to the peace and tranquillity of
the region, and with such attitude to religion, conflicts and upheavals
persists and prevails.
Why would
oil hinder democracy and Uphold authoritarian regime?
This section will present three causal mechanisms
that might explain the alleged link between oil exports and authoritarian rule:
a rentier effect, a repression effect, and a modernization effect. These serve
as compendium of causes in the sustenance of authoritarian regimes which has
over the years, and its effects constituted to the unrest and upheavals in the
region.
The
Rentier Effect
The so
called “rentier states “derive a large share of their revenues from external
rent, i.e. oil, minerals, foreign aid. In certain countries with large oil
exports, the state is thus largely financed directly by oil rents (Luciani,
2013: 114). The general argument is that these states use their oil revenues to
counter mounting social pressures that could potentially lead to claims for
more accountable government. The first component of the argument is that
rentier states are independent of society, as they are not forced collect
taxes. This in turn implies that people are less likely to demand
representation and accountability from their government.
The second component is that oil wealth allows for
spending on patronage or paternalism, which helps forestall any latent pressures
for democratization. In other words, large and unrestrained budgets make
“fiscal pacification” effective (Norton, 2013: 134). A third component involves
a well-financed and oversized state apparatus that might help prevent the
formation of social groups independently of the state. The lack of group
formation inhibits the development of an independent bourgeoisie as well as the
emergence of civil society and social capital both said to be important
requisites of democracy (Ross, 2001: 334).
Repression
effect
In another
perspective, the flow of hydrocarbon rents finances repression, which in turn
diminishes the capacity of populations to mount challenges to autocratic
regimes. An extensive security apparatus as well as military is in the interest
of the wealthy authoritarian government, who wants to defend itself against
popular pressures (Ross, 2001: 335).
Modernization
effect
According to
modernization theory, democracy is a product of a collection of social and
cultural changes (example education, urbanization, specialization) that are
caused by economic development. However, the link is not due to wealth per se,
and resource-led growth will not necessarily entail the relevant societal
changes resulting in a gradual democratization from below.
In sum, the rentier effect entails governments
using high spending and low tax rates to ease democratic pressure; the
repression effect means that governments employ a well-fed security apparatus
to fend off pressures (any form of pressure which might cause agitation as a
result of the system/regime); and finally the modernization effect implies a
superficial economic development not bringing about the social forces that
might otherwise foster pushes for political liberalization
Caveat to
the Oil Explanation
However tempting it might be, one should be wary
when concluding that oil is the sole factor explaining the democratic deficit.
Importantly, one should have in mind that the argument logically does not apply
to the largely non-oil autocracies of Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Egypt and Yemen.
In the same vein, Ross (2001) estimates that, on overage, countries in the
Middle East are about 30 % less democratic than countries outside the region,
even after accounting for the effects of
economic development and oil. In other
words, to get a more nuanced understanding oil’s effects on the regimes of the
region (i.e. not to overestimate it), one should also understand other factors
‘working against’ democracy.
Larry Diamond (2010), for instance, argues that
geopolitics has played an important role beyond the important factor of oil.
Strategic interest by the Soviet Union, but now mainly Europe and the United
States have prompted external support for Arab autocratic that has conferred
crucial economic resources and security assistance. In the case of non-oil
regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, of foreign aid has had virtually
the same effect as oil: it has flowed into the central coffers of the state and
allowed cooption and repression.
A case in point is Egypt receiving vast amounts of
US assistance since 1975 (ibid: 101). Moreover, The Arab-Israeli conflict has
served as a convenient means of diverting public discontent away from the lack
of quality education, social services, jobs, accountability and freedom.
Furthermore, the Arab states reinforce each other in their authoritarianism and
repression. A recent example for this would be the Saudi-supported suppression
of the revolts in Bahrain. Beyond all this, the lack of especially Arab
democracies (perhaps except for Lebanon for a short period) imply that there is
no source of potentially important democratic diffusion inside the Arab world.
Another factor inhibiting the democratic prospects
of the region is the fear that hard-line Islamist might come to power through
the democratic process. This prospect potentially diminishes domestic support
for democracy among otherwise typically democratic forces (middle-class liberal
intellectuals, professionals, and businessmen) and may also imply less Western
pressure and advocacy for democracy in the region.
Finally, Hariri (2012, 2015) presents a structural explanation
of the democratic deficit in the region focusing on the deep roots of
democratization and colonial history. The diffusion of institutions through
European colonial settlement has been an important factor in spreading the
early seeds of democracy. Hariri (2012) argues that the Middle East had
relatively well-developed pre-colonial state institutions and was therefore
long able to resist European colonization and settlement. When territories were
colonized, they were more likely to experience an indirect form of colonial
rule. As such, traditional authority structures have persisted and, in the long
run, these territories were less likely to become democracies. One of the key
feature of the repressive nature of the regimes in the region is the effects of
the Arab Spring; it can be argued that the region’s authoritarian nature
triggered the uprising where the populace felt the pinch of the repression even
to the extent of not being able to freely express themselves.
Concluding
Remarks
For the stability of the greater region,
I feel that it is imperative for the Arab-Israeli conflict to be resolved.
However, as I mentioned above, water is a significant barrier to developing a
just peace without structural violence, which would cripple negotiations from
the start and destine them to unravel. Therefore, cooperation between Israel
and its neighbours over water could be a source for dampening insecurity.
Summing up the arguments around religious
extremism, the arguments herein fall into two consistent themes (1) that
certain forces exist in the Middle East that cause and perpetuate Middle East
extremism and (2) that the Arab world is caught in a time warp between its
unique cultures and traditions and the influences of the modern world.
Essentially, then, the Middle East is divided into at least two competing
philosophies. One is struggling the need to co-exist, which most times causes
upheavals and frictions, and prosper within the context of 21st
century politics and economics, and the other completely rejects contemporary
political or socioeconomic advances in the world community, maintaining a
strict adherence to Shari’a law (which is really a fundamental approach to the
Islamic code). One philosophy tends to be at least willing to explore the
concept of democratic and global market economic principles and the other seeks
to maintain a large proportion of the world’s population in a state of constant
turmoil and turbulence in order to establish their own ideals based on
religious zealotry.
The obvious question that comes to mind when
considering these two competing philosophies is what is ‘best’ for the Middle
East populace? From a Western perspective, and likely most countries with
stable governments, the choice is obvious. The philosophy of co-existence
equates to stable Middle East as a region rid of chaos and upheavals. That is
not to say that improvements cannot be made within the current Middle East
political system. Western governments should continually push for greater
political representation and more market oriented economies in the Middle East.
However, if the philosophy of co-existence is to be made attractive to the
majority of the Middle East populace, then the problem becomes one of how to
address the forces earlier identified as contributing to continued Islamic
extremism and terrorist activities in a manner that mitigates or eliminates
these forces. The answers to this problem are complicated but should be given
focus among current Middle East leaders because they, in the long term, are the
individuals that are going to have to try to institute a populist message that
will engage the Islamic street; the assumption being that individuals will
reject extremism and terrorism when guaranteed political representation and
greater economic opportunity.
How that can be accomplished is left to individual
leaders because the Middle East is a vast mixture of cultures, and only those
individuals that ostensibly know their peoples and have the political fortitude
and desire to extend a populist message will succeed.
Western governments can offer subtle, background
encouragement and guidance, but the message needs to originate from within the
Middle East. Unfortunately, it is probable that if those forces fuelling
extremism are not addressed to the satisfaction of the majority of Middle
Eastern populations, then Islamic extremism and resultant terrorist activities
will continue unabated.
This essay has argued that oil has indeed been a
curse for democracy in the region, where authoritarianism is still strongly
entrenched. With oil appearing a very important impediment to democracy, a
prolonged, decline in oil prices and future energy technology, rendering the
world less dependent on oil, could very well be the indirect forces that make
the region embark on a democratic trajectory in the long term. However, such
developments in the energy market alone will not be able to change the
situation, as there appear to exist a series of other geopolitical,
sociological and colonial-historical factors impeding democracy as well. The paper
strongly believes and argues that when these factors and elements discussed in
this presentation are taken into consideration, there will be less violence and
upheavals in the region.
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